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ESSAY
CONSTITUTIONAL LEGITIMACY
Randy E. Barnett*
The problem of constitutional legitimacy is to establish why anyone
should obey the command of a constitutionally-valid law. A lawmaking sys-
tem is legitimate if there is a prima facie duty to obey the laws it makes.
Neither "consent of the governed" nor "benefits received" justifies obedience.
Rather, a prima facie duty of obedience exists either (a) if there is actual
unanimous consent to the jurisdiction of the lawmaker or, in the absence of
consent, (b) f laws are made by procedures which assure that they are not
unjust. In the absence of unanimous consent, a written constitution should
be assessed as one component of a lawmaking system. To the extent a partic-
ular constitution establishes lawmaking procedures that adequately assure
the justice of enacted laws, it is legitimate even f it has not been consented to
by the people. This account of constitutional legitimacy does not assume any
particular theory of justice, but rather is intermediate between the concept of
justice and the concept of legal validity.
INTRODUCTION
Many constitutional scholars offer their opinions about what the
Constitution means. Some also have theories about how it should be in-
terpreted-or more commonly how it should not be interpreted. But few
stop to consider whether the Constitution is legitimate. This is unfortu-
nate because if the Constitution is not legitimate, then it is not clear why
we should care what it means. And if it is legitimate, we may need to
know why before we can settle on how to interpret what it says.
The Constitution's legitimacy cannot, then, simply be assumed. Un-
less we openly confront the question of its legitimacy, we will never know
whether we should obey it, improve upon it, or ignore it altogether. It is
therefore extremely odd that, for all the verbiage published annually
about the Constitution of the United States, one almost never hears the
issue of its legitimacy addressed systematically. Perhaps this is because,
for many, the Constitution is sacred and any serious treatment of its legiti-
macy would have to admit the possibility that it does not pass muster. It is
as though we are afraid to find that there is no man behind the curtain.
But another possible explanation exists as well.
* Austin B. Fletcher Professor, Boston University School of Law (rbarnett@bu.edu).
I have benefited greatly from comments by Einer Elhauge, Frank Michelman, Dawn
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Despite their silence on the issue, and whatever may be in their
hearts, many constitutional scholars write as though we are not bound by
the actual words of the Constitution. One way to slip these bonds is to
imply that the original Constitution is illegitimate by repeating the re-
frain that we cannot be bound by the "dead hand of the past" or by con-
stantly invoking the various sins of the framers. By delegitimizing the
original Constitution, such rhetoric seeks to free us from its constraints.
Yet it is both curious and significant that few come out and admit this.
Why not? Perhaps because they seek the obedience of the faithful
and, were their delegitimation entirely successful, why on earth would
anyone adhere to the commands of a law professor or philosopher or
political scientist? For that matter, why adhere to the commands of the
man or woman in a black robe, apart from the fact that disobedience is
likely to land you behind bars in an extremely treacherous environment?
By subtly undercutting the legitimacy of the Constitution while at the
same time preserving its much-revered form, a constitutional scholar (or
judge) can become the man behind the curtain, which perhaps is every
scholar's fondest wish. Pay no attention to that bookish professor; the
great and powerful Constitution has spoken!
This is a fraud on the public. Imply but do not say aloud that the
Constitution is illegitimate so we need not follow what it actually says.
Remake it or "interpret" it as one wills and then, because it is The Consti-
tution we are expounding, the masses will have to follow. This strategy
also allows one to adopt a stance of moral superiority towards past genera-
tions without having to assume the responsibility of proclaiming forth-
rightly that the document they wrote, by which the government rules, is
of no authority.
In this Essay, I will ask and answer the question that others seem to
fear: Why should anyone obey the commands issued by persons who
claim to be authorized by the Constitution? In Part I, I examine the most
commonly-held explanation for constitutional legitimacy-that legiti-
macy flows from the fact that "We the People" have consented to this
Constitution, a view commonly referred to as the "consent of the gov-
erned" or "popular sovereignty"-and explain why it is wrong. It is wrong
because it applies a standard of consent that no constitution can meet.
Holding the Constitution to this unattainable ideal both undermines its
legitimacy and allows others to substitute their own meaning for that of
the text. This result is paradoxical since, notwithstanding the great ex-
pansion of suffrage since the nation's founding, any new and improved
"interpretation" of the Constitution also will fail to be legitimated by the
"consent of the governed." In Part II, I then examine and reject the prin-
cipal alternative to arguments based on the "consent of the governed":
that the benefits citizens receive from a constitutional order create a duty
of fair play that obligates them, in return, to obey laws regardless of
whether they consent to do so.
[Vol. 103:111
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Despite the failure of the arguments based on consent or benefits
received, I maintain that laws passed pursuant to a legitimate constitu-
tional authority can still bind us in conscience-that is, create a moral
duty of obedience. In Part III, I begin by showing how, contrary to popu-
lar belief, unanimous consent to governance is both possible and pervasive, but
also why constitutions like that of the United States could never receive
the consent of "We the People." To be binding in conscience without
unanimous consent, a constitution must be legitimated in some other
manner. I then explain why legitimacy in the absence of unanimous con-
sent requires putting enforceable limits on government powers-limits
that would not be necessary if unanimous consent existed.
I will contend that, if a constitution contains adequate procedures to
assure that laws imposed on nonconsenting persons are just (or not un-
just), it can be legitimate even if not consented to unanimously, whereas
a constitution that lacks adequate procedures to ensure the justice of
valid laws is illegitimate even if consented to by a majority. Indeed, only
by realizing that the "consent of the governed" is a fiction can one appre-
ciate the imperative that lawmakers respect the requirements of justice
(whatever one believes those to be).
Though my thesis concerning legitimacy does depend on the claim
that 'justice" is independent of government fiat or whatever may happen
to be commanded by positive law, it does not depend on acceptance of
the particular conception of justice I defend elsewhere.' Regardless of
what conception ofjustice one holds, so long as one holds some conception of
justice, constitutional legitimacy can be seen as a product of procedural
assurances that legal commands are not unjust. The narrow thesis de-
fended here concerns only the proper conception of constitutional legiti-
macy, not all the conditions that may lead to the conclusion that a partic-
ular constitutional regime is or is not legitimate. To assess the legitimacy
of any given legal system would require both this procedural conception
of legitimacy and a conception of justice by which to assess the adequacy
of lawmaking procedures.
The procedural conception of legitimacy defended here is not re-
ducible to a theory of justice and must be distinguished from the more
familiar position commonly attributed to "natural law" theorists that an
unjust law is not (in some sense) a law.2 In what follows, I do not equate
1. See generally Randy E. Barnett, The Structure of Liberty: Justice and the Rule of
Law (1998) [hereinafter Barnett, Structure of Liberty] (defending a liberal conception of
justice grounded in certain individual natural rights that distinguish liberty from license).
2. The actual position of natural law theorists is that an unjust law-though a positive
law-does not bind in conscience. Even Thomas Aquinas was quite capable of
distinguishing as a conceptual matter between those human laws that were just and those
that were unjust when he declared that "[1]aws framed by man are either just or unjust." 2
Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, in 20 Great Books of the Western World 233
.(Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., Encyclopaedia Britannica 1952).
Rather, for Aquinas and other natural law thinkers, the issue of lawfulness is not
conceptual, as it is for modern positivists, but normative. Onlyjust laws "have the power of
2003]
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the legitimacy of a law with its propriety or 'justice"-though these two
concepts are closely related-nor with the mere perception that a partic-
ular law is proper orjust. I readily concede that a validly-enacted law may
be unjust even within a legitimate legal system. Nor does "legitimacy," as
I am using the term, refer to whether a particular law is "valid" because it
was enacted according to the accepted legal process. For example, the
Constitution specifies that to be valid a law must be enacted by majorities
of both houses of Congress and signed by the President.
Rather, the concept of legitimacy I will be advancing stands between
the justice of laws and their validity. It looks to whether the process by
which a law is determined to be valid is such as to warrant that the law is
just. According to my usage, a valid law could be illegitimate and a legiti-
mate law could be unjust. A law may be "valid" because produced in ac-
cordance with all procedures required by a particular lawmaking system,
but be "illegitimate" because these procedures are inadequate to provide
assurances that the law is just. Such a law would not be binding in con-
science. A law might be "legitimate" because it is produced according to
procedures that assure that it is just, and yet be "unjust" because in this
case the procedures (which can never be perfect) have failed. Such a law
would be binding in conscience unless its injustice was somehow
established.3
My discussion of legitimacy will be normative and therefore also
must be distinguished from more sociological or descriptive uses of the
term. Many discussions of legitimacy, perhaps even most, concern
whether a constitution, lawmaking process, or government is perceived to
be legitimate. While a widespread perception of legitimacy may be vital
to obtaining popular acquiescence to a legal regime, I am examining in-
stead the conditions of legitimacy that need to exist for such a perception
to be warranted.
However, one cannot appreciate the superiority of my approach,
which raises questions of its own, without confronting squarely the severe
and insurmountable problems with the conception of legitimacy based
on the consent of the governed or "We the People." So let us now pull
back the curtain and see what we find.
binding in conscience." Id. It is this issue of "binding in conscience" that informs
Aquinas's endorsement of Augustine's statement that "'that which is not just seems to be
no law at all'; therefore the force of a law depends on the extent of its justice." Id. at 227
(emphasis added).
3. The qualification in the text follows from the fact that the duty of obedience I am
discussing is a prima facie or defeasible duty. My claim is that if you hear nothing else
about a law than that it was properly enacted, this is good reason to obey in a system in
which adequate justice-preserving procedures are in place and were followed. What
exactly it would take to rebut this presumption in a legitimate legal system and show that
the procedures have failed and have produced an unjust law is a separate and difficult
question that raises important, and much discussed, questions about civil disobedience.
[Vol. 103:111
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I. THE FICTION OF "WE THE PEOPLE"
The Constitution begins, "We the People of the United States... do
ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America."4
This was not idle rhetoric. These words were offered to claim legitimacy
for the document that followed. The founders' claim of legitimacy was
based, not on the divine right of kings, but on the right of "We the Peo-
ple" to govern themselves. They declared that "We the People" had exer-
cised their rights and had manifested their consent to be ruled by the
institutions "constituted" by this document. They made this declaration
because they believed that the consent of "We the People" was necessary
to establish a legitimate government and that, upon ratification, they
would have gained this consent.
In this Part, I challenge the idea, sometimes referred to as "popular
sovereignty," that the Constitution of the United States was or is legiti-
mate because it was established by "We the People" or the "consent of the
governed." I deny that the conditions needed to make that claim valid as
to this Constitution existed at the time it was adopted or ever could exist.
Though "the People" surely can be bound by their consent, this consent
must be real, not fictional, and unanimous, not majoritarian. Any consent
that is less than unanimous simply cannot bind nonconsenting persons.
Moreover, the fiction of "We the People" can prove dangerous in practice
and can nurture criticisms of the Constitution's legitimacy that are
unwarranted.
A. Basing the Duty to Obey the Law on Consent
Sometimes we speak as though the Constitution itself is or is not
binding on the citizenry. Yet, with one exception, 5 the Constitution does
not purport to bind citizens. Rather, it binds the government itself. As
Rufus King, delegate from Massachusetts, stated to the Constitutional
Convention: "In the establishmt [sic] of Societies the Constitution was to
the Legislature what the laws were to individuals."'6 While the Constitu-
tion is law, it is law in a secondary, not a primary sense. 7 It purports to
bind government officials, not private individuals.
The real question, then, is not whether the Constitution is binding
on citizens, but whether citizens are bound by the commands or laws is-
sued by officials acting in its name. Does the fact that a "law" is validly
enacted according to the Constitution mean that it binds one in con-
science? In other words, is one morally obligated to obey any law that is
4. U.S. Const. pmbl.
5. The Thirteenth Amendment prohibits private persons, not just government, from
enslaving others or holding them in involuntary servitude. U.S. Const. amend. XIII.
6. James Madison, Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787, at 231 (Ohio
Univ. Press 1984) (1840).
7. See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 77-96 (1961) (distinguishing "primary rules"
that direct individuals from "secondary rules" that define how the primary rules are
determined).
20031
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enacted according to constitutional procedures? Or is the only reason to
obey a valid law the fear of punishment should one be caught for
disobedience?
While some legal philosophers disagree, 8 most citizens think that
when a command is called a "law," it carries with it a moral duty of obedi-
ence-though this duty might be rebutted in particular cases. 9 Certainly
most lawmakers and government officials assert that citizens have a moral
duty to obey properly enacted laws. When this is the common perception
of "the law," and when the system that produces these legal commands
lacks the requisite institutional quality-whatever it may be-to justify
this favorable presumption, lawmakers in such a society will get a power-
ful benefit of the doubt or "halo-effect" to which they are not entitled.
Therefore, if the term "law" is to carry the implication that there is a
moral duty to obey, then the requisite binding quality must go in before the
name "law" goes on.
A lawmaking system is legitimate, then, if it creates commands that
citizens have a moral duty to obey. A constitution is legitimate if it creates
this type of legal system. What quality must a constitution have to make it
legitimate in this sense? Why do citizens have a duty to obey the com-
mands of those who are designated by a constitution as lawmakers and
enforcers? Most constitutional scholars avoid explicitly addressing these
questions.
If pressed for an answer, many people would likely rely, at least ini-
tially, on the "consent of the governed" or what is sometimes called "pop-
ular sovereignty."'' Characteristic is the following statement by Michael
McConnell: "The people's representatives have a right to govern, so long
as they do not transgress limits on their authority that are fairly traceable
to the constitutional precommitments of the people themselves . . . ." I
Or, as George Washington said in his farewell address: "The basis of our
political systems is the right of the people to make and to alter their con-
stitutions of government .... The very idea of the power and the right of
8. See, e.g.,Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law 233 (1979) ("[T]here is no obligation
to obey the law.... [T]here is not even a prima facie obligation to obey it.... [T]here is
no obligation to obey the law even in a good society whose legal system is just.") (footnote
omitted). I respond to this position at greater length in Randy E. Barnett, Getting
Normative: The Role of Natural Rights in Constitutional Adjudication, 12 Const.
Comment. 93, 102-05 (1995).
9. This is what philosophers like Raz call a "prima facie" obligation duty, meaning that
one has a duty unless it can be shown that there is some reason why this duty does not
adhere. Raz, supra note 8, at 234-35.
10. See generally Edmund S. Morgan, Inventing the People: The Rise of Popular
Sovereignty in England and America (1988) (tracing development of idea of popular
sovereignty).
II. Michael W. McConnell, The Importance of Humility in Judicial Review: A
Comment on Ronald Dworkin's "Moral Reading" of the Constitution, 65 Fordham L. Rev.
1269, 1291 (1997).
[Vol. 103:111
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the people to establish government presupposes the duty of every individ-
ual to obey the established government. 1 2
While Bruce Ackerman emphatically denies that legislators govern in
the name of the People,"5 throughout two massive works entitled "We the
People," he too apparently assumes that the People can bind themselves,
though he never quite comes out and says this explicitly. Instead, he
speaks repeatedly of "[d]ecisions by the People,' 14 "the constitutional
judgement of We the People,"' 5 the "will of We the People,"' 6 "revision
by the People,"' 7 and the People's "right to change their mind. 18 In
sum, for liberals like Ackerman, no less than for conservatives like Mc-
Connell, "the People" are an entity capable of making decisions, reaching
judgments, having a will, and changing "their mind."1 9
To the contrary, in the next section, I will show that the concept of
"We the People" is a fiction. I will demonstrate that constitutional legiti-
macy has not been conferred by either the individual or the collective
consent of "We the People." As we shall see, the idea of the "consent of
the governed" is not one but a series of different commonly-made argu-
ments that must be distinguished and considered separately to see that
none of them works. Though genuine consent, were it to exist, could
give rise to a duty of obedience, the conditions necessary for "We the
People" actually to consent to anything like the Constitution or amend-
ments thereto have never existed and could never exist.20
12. George Washington, Washington's Farewell Address (Sept. 17, 1796), reprinted in
1 Documents of American History 169, 172 (Henry Steele Commager ed., 9th ed. 1973).
This passage of Washington's speech was reputedly drafted by Alexander Hamilton. See
Joseph J. Ellis, Founding Brothers: The Revolutionary Generation 152 (2001).
13. 1 Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations 184 (1991) [hereinafter
Ackerman, Foundations] ("No small group can ever be transubstantiated into the People
by virtue of legal form." (emphasis omitted)).
14. Id. at 6.
15. Id. at 9.
16. Id. at 10.
17. Id. at 13.
18. Id. at 14.
19. Id. The very phrase "their mind" signals that something is amiss beneath the
surface. If"We the People" have a single mind, should Ackerman not speak of"its mind"?
He would then have to tell us what exactly the "it" is (everyone? a majority?) and how a
diverse multitude of millions of people can have a single mind. If, on the other hand,
there is no single mind, then should he not have said "their minds"? Yet this expression
would weaken the desired imagery of a single deliberating, willing, and acting agent that
(or is it "who"?) exercises judgment.
20. While Ackerman's preoccupation with the trope of "We the People" makes his
work an obvious target of this critique, nowhere in his two path-breaking books does he, to
my knowledge, systematically defend the normative assumption that the "will of We the
People" is actually binding on any particular person, or that constitutionally-enacted laws
are binding on the citizenry. Instead, he defends his "dualist" approach as the best
description of the American constitutional tradition (about which he may well be correct).
See id. at 13 ("My argument ... focuses on the fact that our Constitution has never ...
explicitly entrenched existing higher law against subsequent revision by the People."). I
discuss Ackerman's dualist theory of constitutionalism below. See infra Part I.D.
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B. Why "We the People" is a Fiction
Those who justify a duty to obey the law on the basis of the "consent
of the governed" must explain exactly how and when "We the People"-
you and I and everyone else-consented to obey the laws of the land.
Some claim that by voting we consent to obey the resultant laws; others
contend that residence or the failure to revolt or amend the Constitution
implies consent. All of these theories collapse upon close examination.
Let us consider each in turn.
1. Does Voting Constitute Consent to Obey the Law? - Because we do not
live in a direct democracy in which every individual votes on every law,
the most obvious answer is that we consent to obey the laws when we vote
for the lawmakers who enact them. Just as a person empowers an agent
to represent and bind him, when each of us votes for persons to re-
present us in the legislature, have we not consented to obey the laws for
which they, our designated agents, vote? Perhaps. But suppose the can-
didate we voted for was defeated. In what way did we consent to be "rep-
resented" by his opponent, the very person we voted against? Or suppose
the person we voted to be our representative votes against a particular
law. In what way have we consented to be bound by a law to which we
and our representative were opposed? o
Well, consent does not work that way, comes the response. By choos-
ing to vote, we have consented to the outcome of the election, whatever it
may be. In a game, you consent to play by the rules even when you are
losing. People often consent to a process of binding arbitration in which
they know, when they consent, that they may win or lose. By the same
token, when we participate in the electoral "game" or process, have we
not committed ourselves to respect the outcome when our candidate
loses?
But if consent is a message we communicate to others-"I consent to
be bound by the outcome"-it is not clear that voting conveys such a
message. Suppose some people vote, not because they consent to the
outcome of an election, but in "self-defense"-that is, they vote because
they hope to influence, however marginally, the result so that it is not as
unfavorable to them as it might otherwise be. For example, some people
might vote for the candidate who promises to support a tax cut, not be-
cause they consent to whatever the candidate might do in office, but
solely because they hope to make a tax cut more likely and a tax increase
less likely. They just want to keep more of their earnings. The same
holds true for persons who vote for candidates who support or oppose
abortion rights. To infer from their having voted for such a candidate
the message that these voters consent either to the outcome of the elec-
tion or to all the outcomes of the lawmaking process, whatever they may
be, is to misunderstand the meaning of their voting.
Yes, but by using a vote to try to influence the outcome, has not a
person chosen to participate in the process and does not this choice nec-
essarily entail a consent to abide by the outcome? After all, should their
[Vol. 103:111
HeinOnline -- 103 Colum. L. Rev. 118 2003
CONSTITUTIONAL LEGITIMACY
candidate prevail, voters would expect those who supported the losing
candidate to go along with the winning side. Unless losing voters go
along with the winners, the system would fail to accomplish anyone's
objectives. While this may be so, it does not follow from the fact that
individual voters hope or expect others to go along if their candidate wins
that they, by voting, have consented to be bound themselves. They still
could be voting simply to minimize the threat to their interests posed by
the lawmaking process. Voting with this motivation in no way implies
consent to any outcome that may result. Therefore, the simple act of
voting does not tell us whether the voter consents to the outcome of the
election (and all that follows from it) or whether he or she is voting for
different motives entirely.
While I do not agree that consent to the outcome follows from a vote
cast in self-defense, suppose for the sake of argument that it does. What
then do we say about the consent of those who abstain from voting alto-
gether? They have not expressed any consent to the outcome of an elec-
tion, win or lose, or to the decisions of "representatives" for whom they
have neither voted for nor against. Surely, on the argument presented so
far, they are not bound to obey the law by virtue of their consent.
"Not so fast," comes the reply. Provided that they were given the
option of voting, those who have chosen not to participate in the election
cannot complain. Consider the right of a criminal defendant to be repre-
sented in court by a lawyer. Should he waive his right to counsel and
represent himself, or even stand mute, he cannot object if he is con-
victed-provided he was given the right to be represented. By the same
token, so long as we are free to vote, if we fail to do so we cannot com-
plain however the election comes out. After all, we had the opportunity to
influence the outcome and we freely chose not to employ it.
The analogy to the right to an attorney is inapt. We do not find the
defendant guilty because he consented to be so found. We find him guilty
because we conclude that he is guilty. There is no reason to expect or
require a defendant to consent to his prosecution. Though some defend-
ants might, most probably do not. We do not know and we do not care
because their consent does not matter. In contrast, the argument that we
are bound to obey the laws because we have been given a right to vote is
based on consent-the consent of the governed. It is not clear why, by
giving someone the opportunity to consent, say by voting, one may then
infer consent from a refusal to vote.
This point becomes clearer when one realizes that if consent is an
expression of a willingness to go along with something, then this presup-
poses it is possible to express unwillingness. Just as I can say, "I consent,"
there also must also be a way to say, "I do not consent." I am not here
talking about the likelihood of such a refusal or all the considerations
that might leave one "little choice" but-to consent. Rather, I am simply
insisting that, just as the word "no" means the opposite of "yes," for con-
sent to have any meaning, it must be possible to say "I do not consent"
20031
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instead of "I consent." But notice where the argument has taken us when
consent to obey the laws is based on voting:
If we vote for a candidate and he wins, we have consented to the laws
he votes for, but we have also consented to the laws he votes against.
If we vote against the candidate and he wins, we have consented to
the laws he votes for or against.
And if we do not vote at all, we have consented to the outcome of the
process, whatever it may be.
It is a queer sort of "consent" where there is no way to refuse.
"Heads I win, tails you lose," is the way to describe a rigged contest.
"Heads" you consent, "tails" you consent, "didn't flip the coin," guess
what? You consent as well. This is simply not consent.
2. Does Residency Imply Consent? - When confronted with this argu-
ment, many might say that I have attacked a straw man. No one argues
that consent is to be inferred from voting, or from having a right to
vote.2 ' Rather, the response continues, one consents to obey the laws of
the land because one has chosen to live here. Just as you are bound to
obey your employer (within limits) because you consented to work at
your job, you are bound to obey your landlord (within limits) because
you consented to rent your apartment, and you are bound to obey the
referee (within limits) when you consented to play basketball in a league,
you are bound to obey the commands of government. You can always
leave yourjob, find another apartment, or quit the basketball team, but as
long as you remain you have consented to live by the authority of others
and are bound to do so. By the same token, while you can emigrate from
the country if you want to, so long as you choose to remain, you have
tacitly consented to obey the laws of the United States. Call this the "love
it or leave it" version of consent.
While it is fair to say that one really does impliedly consent to obey
one's employer, a sports official, the usher in the movie theater, etc., it is
not at all clear that one has consented to obey the laws of the United
States simply by virtue of one's failure to emigrate. Certainly no one has
ever asked me for my consent, nor you for yours. Unlike immigrants who
become citizens by taking an explicit oath, those born within the bounda-
ries of the United States are not asked or required to take an oath promis-
ing to obey the laws.
Consider for a moment the implication of such a demand. Suppose
one refused to take the oath. Would one then not be bound to obey the
laws of the United States? Or would one then be expelled from the coun-
try? The latter prospect presupposes that the person who is demanding
we take an oath is an authority who has the right to expel us if we refuse,
21. 1 dispute this, by the way. A lot of people do argue in this manner-or at least
they believe it-until the difficulties of the argument are brought to their attention.
Citations cannot be provided, however, since these sorts of discussions rarely take place in
print.
[Vol. 103:111
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but it is his authority which is at issue in the first place and which suppos-
edly depends on our consent. All of this is quite circular.
It is always hard to explain why a circular argument is circular (with-
out sounding circular yourself), so consider this: Suppose I come to you
and demand that you sign an oath to respect my commands and you
refuse. Upon your refusal I claim a right to your house and order you to
leave the country. You rightly say that this is absurd. I have no authority
to demand that you take an oath, so you are free to ignore me. Your
refusal to take the oath would in no way obligate you to leave the country.
You would be right.
Because you have not consented to my authority, I am in no position
to demand that you either take an oath or leave the country. Were the
present legal system to demand we take an oath, it would be making ex-
actly the same claim. If the reason for taking an oath is to give the
lawmakers authority by our consent, then unless they first have authority,
they cannot demand that we take an oath. But if they already have the
authority to demand we take an oath, then the oath is unnecessary to
establish that authority.
That which is true for oaths is just as true for mere residence. It is
equally unwarranted to base the authority of lawmakers on the so-called
tacit consent of everyone who chooses to live here and does not leave the
country. For remaining in this country only tacitly indicates consent if
you assume that the lawmakers have the initial authority to demand your
obedience or your exit in the first place. But it is their authority which is
supposed to be justified on the basis of your and my tacit consent. So the
problem with inferring consent from a refusal to leave the country is that
it presupposes that those who demand you leave already have authority
over you. Your decision to stay, therefore, cannot be the source of their
authority. And their authority, if it exists, does not rest on your consent.
Lea Brilmayer has dubbed this the "bootstrapping objection. ' '22
Brilmayer correctly identifies this as an objection to territorial jurisdic-
tions that purport to be based on consent, not as an objection to nonter-
ritorial jurisdictions based on actual consent:
These bootstrapping objections to contractarian formation of a
government do not necessarily arise when parties create govern-
mental entities that lack territorial status. One might, for in-
stance, agree with another individual that in the event of a dis-
pute both will submit to binding arbitration. Although the
arbitrator's authority is established by consent, its authority is
not territorial. In such cases, only the actual participants are
bound; the extent of authority is not defined territorially. 23
Thus, this objection will not apply to lawmaking jurisdictions based on
actual unanimous consent as described in Part III.
22. Lea Brilmayer, Consent, Contract, and Territory, 74 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 12 (1989).
23. Id. at 16.
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Besides its circularity, there is another reason to reject the "love it or
leave it" conception of consent. As I have already noted, "I consent" is a
message we communicate to others. Saying the words "I consent" is fairly
unambiguous (so long as there is a way to express a refusal to consent).
Depending on the context, there are few, if any, other meanings we can
attach to these words. Simply remaining in the country, however, is
highly ambiguous. It might mean you consent to be bound by the laws
enacted by Congress; or it might mean you have a goodjob and could not
find a better one in another country; or it might mean that you speak
only English; or it might mean that you do not want to leave your loved
ones behind. It is simply unwarranted to conclude from the mere act of
remaining in the country that one has consented to all or any of the laws
thereof.
Before the Holocaust, many Jews remained in Germany when they
had a chance to escape; they chose to stay for a variety of reasons.
Whatever else we can say about their decision, we cannot conclude that,
merely by their presence, they tacitly assented to the Nuremberg laws. I do
not mean to put too much stress on this argument. There were many
characteristics of the Third Reich that undermined its authority and that
made it substantially different in this regard from the United States. My
point is merely that, simply by remaining in the country of their birth at a
time they were free to leave, German Jews cannot be said to have con-
sented to whatever laws were enacted in that country. Neither have we.
And, to return to the bootstrapping objection, the Nazis had no authority
based on the consent of German Jews to put them to this choice.
3. Are We Bound by the Consent of the Founders? - Those who wish to
base the duty to obey the laws on popular sovereignty or the "consent of
the governed" will not give up at this point. They will then point to the
fact that the government of the United States predates the birth of every-
one alive today. Because it was here first, it can demand that one consent
to its authority or leave the country. Recall the quote from Michael Mc-
Connell with which we began: "The people's representatives have a right
to govern, so long as they do not transgress limits on their authority that
are fairly traceable to the constitutional precommitments of the people
themselves .... "24
The initial source of the authority of "the people's representatives"
was not your or my consent, goes the argument, but the consent of "We
the People" at the time the government was founded. It is that consent
that got the government up and running legitimately, and it is that con-
sent that empowers it to demand that you "love it or leave it." If you are
born in and grow up in someone else's house, for example, you must
obey the rules of the owner or move out. Your continued presence con-
stitutes consent to the authority of the homeowner.
24. McConnell, supra note 11, at 1291.
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Moreover, a popular sovereignty theorist also might make the some-
what different argument that the issue of "consent of the governed" was
never whether you or I consented to obey the laws by our vote or by re-
maining in the country. The real source of consent was the initial con-
sent of the "We the People" to the formation of a government, and from
then on, so long as the People do not successfully revolt against the gov-
ernment, they can be said to have tacitly consented to it. It is the failure
to overthrow the government, not the refusal to leave the country, that
constitutes our consent to obey its commands.
Both arguments invoke the legitimate origin of the Constitution and
rest that legitimacy on the consent of "We the People" of 1789. It is this
consent that gives the Constitution its initial legitimacy and which after-
wards puts the onus on the citizenry to obey, leave the country, or success-
fully revolt. This shift in argument from our consent to the consent of
"We the People" at the time of the founding now requires us to ask who
exactly it was that consented to the creation of this government and what
it was that gave them the power to so bind themselves and their posterity.
We shall immediately see the exact same problems here as we saw with
voting, only once removed. Now we are talking about deficiencies in other
people's consent, not our own.
The Constitution was not approved by a unanimous vote, nor even
by a majority of all persons in the country at the time. It was approved by
a majority of delegates to conventions in each state. These delegates were
elected by a majority of those who voted for delegates. Were the dele-
gates who voted against the Constitution (and those who voted for these
dissenting delegates) bound by their consent? And what about the major-
ity of inhabitants who were not permitted to vote for any delegate?
Though voting requirements varied with local jurisdictions, in no place
could women, children, aliens, indentured servants, or slaves vote. More--
over, it was not uncommon to have a property requirement that limited
the voting rights of white males and free black males. In what sense can a
small minority of inhabitants presuming to call themselves "We the Peo-
ple" bind anyone but themselves? And assuming they could somehow
bind everyone then alive, how could they bind, by their consent, their
posterity?25
One response to this, already suggested above, is that the refusal to
revolt or overthrow the government is what constitutes an ongoing tacit
consent to obey the lawful commands of the system the founders created.
But this is asking much too much of those who would refuse their con-
sent. Does one really manifest a consent to obey the commands of some-
one much more powerful simply because one does not physically resist
the threat of violence for noncompliance? True, physical resistance is
25. For what it is worth, in the Preamble to the Constitution, the framers do not
purport to bind their posterity but rather to secure for it "the Blessings of Liberty." U.S.
Const. pmbl.
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evidence of a lack of consent, but if the cost of physical resistance is high
enough, we cannot conclude that a passive nonresistance equals consent.
The same is true to a lesser extent about a failure to emigrate. The
cost of emigration, in terms of what one gives up by leaving, is simply too
high to infer from the failure to emigrate a consent to obey the laws of
the land. Moreover, the failure of enough people to band together to
overthrow a government tells us nothing about the consent of the individ-
ual to be bound by the commands of the government, and therefore it
tells us nothing about why laws are binding on individuals. To argue oth-
erwise is to assert that the majority, by its failure to revolt, can bind the
minority to obey the laws.
To this the popular sovereignty theorist might respond that, when
the Constitution provides less costly mechanisms for change-such as an
amendment process-it is the failure to amend the Constitution, rather
than the failure to revolt successfully against the government, that
manifests consent to obey all the laws. But this response is transparently
inadequate. Whether a constitutional amendment requires a
supermajority vote of both houses of Congress and approval by three
quarters of state legislatures, or a simple majority of the electorate, the
failure to obtain an amendment through this process hardly indicates
consent by anyone to the existing regime. A refusal to approve a change
in the Constitution implies neither that those who supported the de-
feated amendment nor those who opposed it consented to the existing
regime. In the end, we are returned once more to the problem of infer-
ring the consent of the minority or of the individual from the consent of
the majority. Consent simply does not work that way.
We are now in a position to appreciate the fundamental reason why
none of the foregoing arguments based on consent succeeds: For con-
sent to bind a person, there must be a way to say "no" as well as "yes," and
that person himself or herself must have actually consented. Unless we
are speaking of children, incompetents, or principals who have actually
consented to be represented by an agent, no person can literally consent
for another. This fact poses an insurmountable obstacle for all theories
of legitimacy that base the "consent of the governed" on anything less
than unanimity. As Jeffrey Reiman has argued,
[T]here is nothing inherently legitimating about the electoral
process. If anything, the electoral process is the problem, not
the solution .... [T]he policies that emerge from the electoral
process will be imposed on the dissenting minority against its
wishes. And then, rather than answering the question of legiti-
macy, this will raise the question with respect to those dissenters.
Why are the exercises of power approved by the majority against
the wishes of (and potentially prohibiting the desired actions of)
the minority obligatory with respect to the minority? Why are
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such exercises of power not simply a matter of the majority tyr-
annizing the minority?26
Arguments on behalf of constitutional legitimacy based on majoritarian
rather than unanimous consent attempt the moral equivalent of squaring
a circle.
4. Why Acquiescence Does Not Equal Consent. - The appeal of argu-
ments based on tacit consent dies hard, however, and perhaps this is the
reason: Can we not say that almost everyone in some sense "accepts" the
current government of the United States as legitimate? Would not the
number who reject its legitimacy be very small indeed? Were this not the
case, would not the government be hopelessly unstable? If general acqui-
escence to the existing legal regime is an empirical fact, and one that is
essential to its functioning existence, can the regime not also claim the
tacit consent of the population and the legitimacy that flows from such
consent?
Those who base tacit consent on general acquiescence have con-
fused a "rule of recognition" with the conditions of constitutional legiti-
macy. A rule of recognition is the way the population can identify the
existence of an operating legal regime.2 7 Butjust as knowing that a par-
ticular command is "the law" does not tell us whether it is binding in
conscience, knowing that a legal regime "exists" as a result of general
acquiescence does not tell us whether there is a moral duty to obey its
commands.
Of course, some form of general acquiescence is necessary for any
constitution to be implemented and to maintain its continued existence
as positive law. As Frederick Schauer has noted, this acquiescence distin-
guishes the Constitution of the United States from another document
entitled "The Constitution of the United States" that I might write and
have my friends ratify.28 Ratification by plebiscite or representative con-
26. Jeffrey Reiman, The Constitution, Rights, and the Conditions of Legitimacy, in
Constitutionalism: The Philosophical Dimension 127, 134 (Alan S. Rosenbaum ed., 1988).
As he elaborates:
These questions not only point up the error of taking electoral accountability as
an independent source of legitimacy, they also suggest that it is mistaken to think
of electoral accountability and constitutional provisions as alternative sources of
legitimacy. Rather, the Constitution with its provisions limiting the majority's ability to
exercise power is the answer to the question of why decisions voted by a majority are
binding on the minority who disagree.
Id.
27. See Hart, supra note 7, at 92-93 (stating that a rule of recognition is "a rule for
conclusive identification of the primary rules of obligation"). Notice Hart's reference here
to the "rules of obligation." Hart also contended that if the rule of recognition were
satisfied, citizens would then not only be compelled or "obliged" to obey the law, they
would also be under an "obligation" or duty to obey. Id. at 84-85. This I reject for reasons
I have given elsewhere. See Barnett, Structure of Liberty, supra note 1, at 17-23.
28. Frederick Schauer, Precedent and the Necessary Externality of Constitutional
Norms, 17 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 45, 52 (1994) ("[O]nly one of these 'Constitutions'
would be the Constitution of the United States, because only one of these documents would
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ventions can provide an effective rule of recognition to the population
and can help to attain a general acquiescence to the constitutional re-
gime, though these procedures are far from indispensable.
However acquired, mere acquiescence-which every existing govern-
ment and scheme of positive law can claim-and unanimous consent can-
not be the same thing. For what is at issue here is not whether a legal
system exists, but whether a particular existing constitutional regime is
legitimate. Only if it is legitimate can an existing legal system issue com-
mands to the citizenry that bind individuals in conscience. If acquies-
cence, which every functioning regime can claim, equaled unanimous
consent, even the most oppressive regime could claim to be entitled to a
duty of obedience on the basis of such "consent" so long as it managed to
exist. Clearly this proves too much.
While some degree of acquiescence may be necessary to establish a
command as positive law, more than acquiescence is needed to create a
moral duty to obey such a command. James Madison caught a glimpse of
the moral problem when he observed in 1784 that the unratified Virginia
Constitution "rests on acquiescence" only, which is a "dangerous basis."'29
Actual consent by an individual can create a moral duty, but one individ-
ual cannot consent for another, and unanimous consent, all concede,
cannot and has never existed. 3 11
There is considerable irony in the widespread claim that "tacit" con-
sent is the source of the duty to obey the laws. Many who assert this
would never accept so attenuated a notion of consent to justify, say, the
lease of a television or the waiver of liability for harm. In these contexts,
they demand a rarified version of "informed" consent that hardly, if ever,
exists. They require "complete information" on everything one is con-
senting to (or giving up) and a diversity of sufficiently attractive alterna-
tive choices before concluding that someone has actually consented to an
enforceable contract to buy a stereo. Unless these conditions are met,
they insist that such consent is "fictitious" or "coerced."'' Yet we are
asked, often by the very same people, to accept the proposition that
merely by virtue of living in the town in which we were born or by failing
have been accepted, socially and politically, by the people of the United States as their
Constitution.").
29. James Madison, Notes for a Speech Favoring Revision of the Virginia Constitution
of 1776, in 8 The Papers of James Madison 75, 78 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1973).
Madison believed that if "ratified by" the people, the Virginia Constitution would be "more
stable and secured agst. [sic] the doubts & imputations under which it now labours." Id.
30. Though unanimous consent to something like the Constitution is impossible to
obtain, I explain later in this Essay why, contrary to popular assumption, unanimous
consent to other governance structures is both quite possible and quite common. See
infra Part II.A.
31. Examples of this view are almost too numerous to require citation. See, e.g., Jean
Braucher, Contract Versus Contractarianism: The Regulatory Role of Contract Law, 47
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 697, 713 (1990); Peter Linzer, Is Consent the Essence of Contract?-
Replying to Four Critics, 1998 Ann. Surv. Am. L. 213, 217-20 (1988).
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to leave the country, we have consented to obey nearly any command that
is enacted by the reigning legal system. And the consent of a majority is
supposed to bind not only members of that majority, but dissenters and
future generations as well.
The problem of legitimacy considered here is whether the com-
mands of an existing legal system bind the citizenry in conscience. If the
issue of legitimacy is only raised when there exists a functioning legal
system and there can be no legal system without some form of acquies-
cence, then acquiescence could be viewed as a necessary, but not suffi-
cient, condition of legitimacy. By the same token, if the perception of legit-
imacy is necessary to obtain acquiescence, then whatever contributes to
that perception could also be viewed as a necessary condition of
legitimacy.
Nevertheless, incorporating acquiescence into the conception of le-
gitimacy in this way does not affect my basic thesis: To be legitimate in
the absence of actual consent, an existing legal system must provide assur-
ances that the laws it imposes are both necessary and proper. 2 However
it is obtained, acquiescence is insufficient to provide this assurance.
Though acquiescence may be needed to establish the commands of a le-
gal system as positive law, it is neither the same as, nor an adequate substi-
tute for, actual consent.
C. The Dangerous Fiction of "We the People"
Some fictions are harmless, some even beneficial. As Edmund Mor-
gan has shown, the fiction of popular sovereignty originated as an anti-
dote to the fiction of the divine right of the king.33 If the king obtained
his authority from God, the Commons gained its authority from the Peo-
ple. Paradoxically, the fiction of the divine king was used to limit his
power. First, it could be used to deny any intentions to the king that were
unworthy of a perfect being. "[D]ivinity, when assumed by mortals (or
imposed upon them) can prove more constricting than subjection. In-
deed, the attribution of divinity to the king had probably always been
motivated in some measure by the desire to limit him to actions becom-
ing a god."'34 Second, the divinity of the king did not extend to anyone
but himself, especially excluding the ministers who actually ran afoul of
the Commons. "The king was divine and unaccountable, but those he
commissioned to act for him shared neither his divinity nor the unac-
countability that went with it. To the Commons his agents were all sub-
jects; and if they acted in the king's name, they must do so at their
peril."35
32. I borrow this standard from the Constitution itself and will explain below what
precisely I mean by it. See infra Part II.C.2.
33. See generally Morgan, supra note 10, at 17-77.
34. Id. at 21.
35. Id. at 33.
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In a like manner could the fiction of the legislature deriving its just
powers from the People be used to constrain its power. True, the "imme-
diate objective of the change in fictions was to magnify the power not of
the people themselves, but of the people's representatives. '36 But a dan-
ger immediately emerged: "With the fictional people suddenly supreme,
actual people, as embodied in local communities, found their traditional
rights and liberties in jeopardy from a representative body that recog-
nized only a fictional superior."3 7 Without some constraint, "the sover-
eignty of the people would pose graver threats not only to the wishes but
also to the rights and liberties of actual people, than the divine right of
kings had ever done. '38
The English responses to this threat were varied and took considera-
ble time and struggle to develop.39 Later in the United States, after an
initial near-disastrous experimentation with legislative supremacy un-
checked by a monarchy, the response took the form of constitutional
constraints not only on the legislature but on the fictional People them-
selves. Those who drafted and adopted the Constitution realized better
than some of their compatriots what we have largely forgotten: that the
reality of rule by legislative majorities combined with the fiction of "We
the People" can be a dangerous mixture.
Despite their rhetorical commitment to "popular sovereignty," by the
time the Constitution was written, its framers were pretty well convinced
that pure majority rule or democracy was a bad idea. As Jack Rakove
explains, at the founding it was thought that " [t] he majority deserved not
so much to rule as to be protected from misrule, not so much to legislate
in pursuit of its interests as to be secured against statutes that would re-
flect the ambitions of the privileged class.'' 4
Those who pushed for a new constitution had experienced state gov-
ernments that were dominated by powerful one-house legislatures, weak
governors, and a subservient judiciary-and they did not like what they
saw. The result was what Madison called the problem of faction. "By a
faction," Madison wrote in Federalist 10, "I understand a number of citi-
zens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are
united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest,
adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate in-
terests of the community."4'
36. Id. at 58.
37. Id. at 53.
38. Id. at 82.
39. See generally id. at 55-121.
40. Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of the
Constitution 233 (1997). Rakove's discussion of "the Mirror of Representation" makes
clear that the framers of the Constitution were rejecting, or at least mitigating, the
competing principle of republican or popular rule that had arisen in the states in the wake
of the Revolution. See id. at 203-43.
41. The Federalist No. 10, at 78 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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Madison understood, perhaps better than some others of the period,
that majorities were as great a danger to the rights retained by the people
as a corrupt minority or an individual despot.
Wherever the real power in a Government lies, there is the dan-
ger of oppression. In our Governments the real power lies in
the majority of the community, and the invasion of private rights
is chiefly to be apprehended, not from acts of Government con-
trary to the sense of its constituents, but from acts in which the
Government is the mere instrument of the major number of the
Constituents. 42
By giving power to majorities operating through their representatives, the
interest of majorities becomes a greater source of danger both to minori-
ties and to the general welfare under popular government than under
other forms.
So great a danger needs to be guarded against carefully. To this end,
the founders devised a new scheme in which an electorate of "the Peo-
ple," by voting in elections, would exercise not a lawmaking power, but
the power to "check" the lawmakers. "We the People" would not rule
directly, but an electorate reflecting the rights and interests of the people
would have effective power to check those who would issue commands to
the people.43 By the same token, state governments would have the
power to "check" federal legislation through Senators chosen by state leg-
islatures. Their novel and even ingenious scheme of multiple checks and
balances was positioned somewhere between rule by a "democratic" ma-
jority and rule by an "aristocratic" minority.
In the intervening 200 years, we have moved away from a conception
of "popular sovereignty" in which the people, through the electorate, ef-
fectively check the exercises of government power, and towards a fiction
of "popular sovereignty" in which a democratic majority rules. Many no
longer conceive of Congress as an institution charged with performing
certain vital tasks, a group of select men and women who are the servants
of and checked by the people. Instead they picture Congress as 'We the
People" itself. Under the prevailing theory of "popular sovereignty," the
legislature is thought of as the people personified, entitled to exercise all
the powers of a sovereign people.
Some use such slogans as "We are the government" or "the govern-
ment is us" (though I heard this more frequently in my youth before
Vietnam and Watergate). This view of government gives legislators an
enormous power to do what they will, provided only that they muster the
requisite number of votes. For if "we are the government," then we
would seem to consent to anything the government does. The fiction of
42. Letter from James Madison to ThomasJefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in I Letters and
Other Writings of James Madison 421, 425 (J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1867).
43. Notice that while it is a fiction to speak of rule by "the people" as a whole, it need
not be at all fictitious to speak of imposing rules on the people or of violating the rights
retained by the people.
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popular sovereignty, therefore, becomes dangerous when legislatures are
conceived of as a literal surrogate for "We the People" themselves. Be-
cause "the people" can "consent" to alienate any particular liberty or
right-though not their more abstract inalienable rights-legislatures, as
the people's surrogate, can restrict almost any liberty and justify it in the
name of popular consent. The fiction of popular rule, as opposed to a
popular check on rulers, allows a legislature to justifiably do almost any-
thing it wills. And this, in turn, allows majority and minority factions of
the electorate to gain control and wield the power of the legislative
branch at the expense of the aggregate rights of their fellow citizens.
D. Diminishing the Danger: Ackerman's Dualist Democracy
Bruce Ackerman refers to the view that legislatures function as "the
People" themselves as "monistic democracy" in which "[d]emocracy re-
quires the grant of plenary lawmaking authority to the winners of the last
general election. . . . [and] all institutional checks upon the electoral
victors are presumptively antidemocratic. ' '44 By contrast, Ackerman de-
nies that "the winner of a fair and open election is entitled to rule with
the full authority of We the People. '45 Instead, he distinguishes "the will
of We the People from the acts of We the Politicians." 4 6 Ackerman posits
a "dualist" constitution in which normal, validly-enacted legislation is not
confused with the "higher lawmaking" that "represents the constitutional
judgment of We the People. '47 That appellation is limited to lawmaking
initiatives that follow an "arduous obstacle course ' 48 designed to create a
"deepening dialogue between leaders and masses within a democratic
structure that finally succeeds in generating broad popular consent for a
sharp break with the status quo."' 4 9
Ackerman's dualism represents a refreshing and important improve-
ment over the still-dominant conception of popular sovereignty. To the
extent that legislative will is decoupled from "We the People," the danger
of that fiction is greatly reduced. No longer is the process of systemati-
cally checking legislative rule seen as running afoul of the so-called
"countermajoritarian difficulty."50 Moreover, there is much to be said for
dualism as a descriptive account of how constitutional doctrine actually
changes over time.
44. Ackerman, Foundations, supra note 13, at 8.
45. Id. at 9.
46. Id. at 10.
47. Id. at 9.
48. Id. at 10.
49. Id. at 19. Note the reliance here on "popular consent."
50. See Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at
the Bar of Politics 16-23 (1962) (noting judiciary's role in checking political legislators);
see generally Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One:
The Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 333 (1998) (chronicling challenges to
judicial independence).
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Nevertheless, at one juncture Ackerman claims to have provided "a
normative argument"5 1 that rests on the imperative of gaining the "con-
sidered support" of "We the People."52 This does not mean that he
thinks he has provided a normative argument for why individuals are
bound to obey constitutional laws. Such a question is neither raised nor
addressed in his two works, but the arguments I have offered here suggest
that Ackerman's dualist theory of constitutionalism provides no answer.
Though denying the authority of "the People" to ordinary legisla-
tion, Ackerman ultimately claims that the result of "higher lawmaking" is
entitled to be called the will of "We the People." He speaks freely and
unselfconsciously of "principles of higher law validated by the People dur-
ing their relatively rare success in constitutional politics"'5 3 and of "funda-
mental principles . . . affirmed by the People. '54 But all this too is a fic-
tion and, therefore, could notjustify a duty of obedience in the citizenry.
Though "the People" can be said to really exist-pointing to the 250
million or so citizens of the United States, each one of whom also has
rights-the people as a whole never speak and never validate anything.
Only some subset, whether a majority or minority of the whole, ever vote
for or against anything and, even if those who support some constitu-
tional change can somehow bind themselves (which I doubt), their votes
cannot bind either dissenters or nonvoters. Consent, as we have seen,
does not work that way. Perhaps because he defines his project as largely
descriptive (the statement quoted above notwithstanding), Ackerman
does not confront the fictional nature of rule by "We the People." This
leaves the normative question of constitutional legitimacy-how individu-
als come to be bound to obey lawful commands-unaddressed by his con-
stitutional dualism.
Recalling Ackerman's vivid account of the transformative effect of
"higher lawmaking" leads me to close this Part with an important caveat.
I have argued to this point only that a duty to obey the law cannot be
grounded on the consent of the governed when there has been anything
less than unanimous consent and that, quite obviously, no government
legal system can claim this degree of consent. I am not claiming that adop-
tion of constitutions (or laws) by popular vote or conventions is a bad idea. It
may well be that such ratification processes are a very good idea because
they enhance the likelihood that whatever does legitimate a constitution
actually exists. Moreover, such adoption procedures may effectively se-
cure the general acquiescence which is a requirement of any functioning
legal order, whether or not it is legitimate.
51. 2 Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Transformations 6 (1998).
52. See id. (describing how dualism "prevents the political elite from undermining
the hard-won achievements of the People . . . and mobilize[s] their considered support
before foundational principles may be revised in a democratic way").
53. Ackerman, Foundations, supra note 13, at 21.
54. Id.
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I am only challenging the widely-held assumption that, because of
popular sovereignty or the consent of the governed, "We the People" are
even presumptively bound in conscience to obey any law that is enacted
by constitutional means. Further, since unanimous consent is never re-
quired, in practice the "consent of the governed" is reduced to the con-
sent of a majority of legislators who are elected by a majority of those who
vote in an election. "We the People" is, in short, a fiction that, by falsely
assuming the presence of consent whenever legislatures enact statutes,
has dangerously eroded the rights and liberties of each and every one of
the People.
II. PROBLEMATIC ALTERNATIVES TO "WE THE PEOPLE"
In the final analysis, the only way that a duty to obey the law can be
based on consent is when consent is given. Anything less than unani-
mous consent cannot bind those who dissent. Those who acknowledge
this take one of two positions. As we saw earlier, some like Raz maintain
that there is no prima facie or presumptive duty to obey the law just be-
cause it is the law.5 ' Though conceptually defensible, this position is un-
acceptable in regimes where lawmakers are given the benefit of the doubt
and it is widely thought that there exists a duty to obey enacted laws.
Others abandon popular sovereignty by contending that lawmaking au-
thority is not based on the "consent of the governed" after all, but on
something else. What is this "something else"?
A. Fair Play: Does the Receipt of Benefits Obligate Us to Obey?
According to one such argument, laws are binding, not because of
the consent of "We the People," but because people who receive the ben-
efits of the legal system are bound to obey its demands. It is not consent,
they say, but receipt of benefits that binds one. Sometimes called the "prin-
ciple of fair play,"'56 this theory has been much discussed among philoso-
phers and I shall not try to summarize the nuances of the debate.5 7
55. See Raz, supra note 8, at 233.
56. John Rawls's early theory of legal obligation based on the "duty of fair play," while
superficially resembling a benefits received argument, actually depends "upon our having
accepted and our intention to continue accepting the benefits of a just scheme of
cooperation that the constitution defines." John Rawls, Legal Obligation and the Duty of
Fair Play, in Law and Philosophy 10 (Sydney Hook ed., 1964) (emphasis added). This
therefore is not a pure benefits received argument. "[Aln essential condition of the
obligation is the justice of the constitution and the general system of law being roughly in
accordance with it. Thus the obligation to obey ... an unjust law depends strongly on
there being a just constitution." Id. This makes the structure of Rawls's old theory very
similar to that presented in Part III, though it adds a requirement of voluntary acceptance
of benefits that I think is unnecessary to justify a prima facie duty to obey laws that are
produced by procedures that assure their justice.
57. For a good cross section of scholarly opinion, see generally The Duty to Obey the
Law: Selected Philosophical Readings (Williamson A. Edmunson ed., 1999).
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One powerful criticism of this position, by Robert Nozick, is that it
too is ultimately based not merely on "receipt" of benefits, but on some
notion of consent.58 If, out of the blue, I send you a valuable item, are
you obliged to pay for it in the absence of consent? Are you even obliged
to return it to me? Most would answer no. Likewise, most would believe
that we are not obligated to pay for benefits that are thrust upon us by
others. Some may say that if you choose to use the item, then you have
obligated yourself to pay for it. There may be some merit to this sugges-
tion: Using an item that you know has been sent to you with the expecta-
tion of repayment may indicate a consent to pay. (Even this does not
necessarily mean, that you are obligated to return the item rather than
discard it.) It is still not clear, however, that one is obligated to pay for all
unsolicited benefits one receives from others. We may get great pleasure
from wonderful architecture, or from seeing an attractive person walk by,
without conceding for a moment that we could be charged for the genu-
ine enjoyment we experience.
But I shall not pursue the matter further here, because the kinds of
benefits supposedly received from a legal system-the benefit of social
cooperation, for example-are benefits that one cannot refuse no matter
how hard one tries. Unless one can somehow refuse a benefit that is
thrust upon him or her, it is not at all clear that one is obligated to pay
for it either in money or in obedience. For the same reason, it is not at
all clear why the "benefit" one receives from living in the particular legal
system we have-benefits we cannot decline to "enjoy" even if we want
to-obligates one to obey the commands of this system.
When we move beyond the benefits of a "scheme of cooperation"
supposedly provided by the legal system to tangible benefits-like roads,
parks, schools, etc.-we find that most are paid for by taxation, payments
that certainly are not consented to in any meaningful way. Must everyone
whose income is confiscated to pay for roads, parks, and schools (to some
unknowable extent) decline to make use of these resources lest they be
accused of voluntarily benefitting from them and, therefore, of owing not
only a duty to obey the laws, but a moral duty to pay for them as well?
In an influential essay, John Simmons defends the "fair play" argu-
ment against Nozick's critique by denying it is based on mere "receipt" of
benefits. A fairer reading, he contends, is that based instead on acceptance
of benefits by participants in a particular system.
[F]or an individual to be a real participant in a cooperative
scheme, he must have either (1) pledged his support, or tacitly
agreed to be governed by the scheme's rules, or (2) played some
active role in the scheme after its institution. It is not enough to
be associated with the "schemers" in some vague way; one must
go out and do things to become a participant or "insider"....59
58. Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia 90-95 (1974).
59. A. John Simmons, The Principle of Fair Play, in The Duty to Obey the Law:
Selected Philosophical Readings, supra note 57, at 107, 124-25.
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For Simmons, the problem with the argument so reformulated to avoid
collapsing into the tacit consent position, is that "it will by no means be a
standard case in which all beneficiaries of a cooperative scheme's work-
ings have accepted the benefits they receive." 60
Like unanimous consent, Simmons contends that "benefits ac-
cepted" can potentially provide the basis for a duty to obey, but (also like
unanimous consent) that its conditions cannot ordinarily be obtained in
modern political structures.
While it is clear that at least most citizens of most states receive
benefits from the workings of their legal and political institu-
tions, how plausible is it to say that they have voluntarily accepted
those benefits, in even the cases of the most democratic political
societies now in existence? Not, I think, very plausible.,'
Simmons describes "acceptance" as an attitude that requires certain
attributes.
Among other things, we must understand that the benefits flow
from a cooperative scheme, rather than regarding them as
"free" for the taking. And we must, for instance, think that the
benefits we receive are worth the price we must pay for them
(with the burdens involved) or leaving them.62
Simmons then denies that most persons have the requisite beliefs and
attitudes.
Most citizens will, I think, fall into one of these two classes:
those who have not "accepted" because they have not taken the
benefits (with accompanying burdens) willingly, and those who
have not "accepted" because they do not regard the benefits of
government as the product of a cooperative scheme. 63
For all of these reasons, the argument for a duty to obey the laws
based on benefits either "received" or "accepted" has fared little better
than the argument based on the tacit consent of the governed. But there
is more. Someone defending a duty of obedience based on the receipt of
benefits might respond that both of these criticisms evade the basic point:
Benefits received provide an argument for obedience wholly apart from
either consent or acceptance, and for this reason it is inadequate to re-
spond that tacit consent to obey or pay or acceptance of a benefit is
lacking.
So let us take this argument at face value and assume that one really
does owe a duty of obedience to anyone who takes it upon him or herself,
without the consent or acceptance of the recipient, to provide another with (vi-
tal?) benefits. Could this not be offered as a justification for the legiti-
macy of chattel slavery? Could not a slave holder claim, often accurately,
that he was indeed providing his charges with vital benefits: food, cloth-
60. Id. at 132.
61. Id. at 136.
62. Id. at 137.
63. Id.
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ing, shelter, medical attention when needed, protection from predation
by outsiders, and so on? Of course, one might quarrel with the accuracy
of this claim, but on what grounds? That food, shelter, and the rest are
not "benefits"? Hardly. That these benefits are not adequate? According
to what scale of adequacy? Do citizens of severely impoverished countries
have no duty to obey the law because the benefits provided by those law-
making systems are too niggardly? At what point do the benefits become
great enough to generate a duty of obedience in the absence of consent?
Is the moral problem with chattel slavery that masters do not pay the
minimum wage?
To better appreciate why the nonconsensual receipt of benefits can-
not be the source of a duty of obedience, imagine a very generous master
who provides all essentials and even a degree of choice or freedom to his
vassals-or house slaves-which they nevertheless are unable to refuse.
Are the slaves of sufficiently bounteous masters morally obligated to obey
them? What is the problem with this entire line of argument? The obvi-
ous answer is that what is lacking is the consent of the slave. Were there
consent to the relationship, then we would not (or should not) describe it
as slavery at all-provided that the servant was free to exit the relation-
ship.64 But if consent is required to convert a morally impermissible slav-
ery into a duty of obedience, then such consent cannot be fictitious. It
must be real, and we already have seen that there is and can be no real
consent to the sort of legal system established by the Constitution.
Does all this entail a conclusion that, in the absence of actual con-
sent, the fact that an enacted law is constitutional never gives rise to a
duty of obedience? I think not. In Part III, I shall offer an alternative
source of the duty to obey laws in the absence of consent. However, at this
juncture what is most important is seeing (1) consent to the sort of law-
making process established by the Constitution is both nonexistent and
impossible to achieve; and (2) the dispensation of benefits by lawmakers
does not generate a duty to obey their commands in the absence of con-
sent. If such a duty exists, it must be grounded in some other way and,
unless some alternative justification exists, there is no duty to obey the
commands of these lawmakers.
Though it is not hard to see why consent is needed to convert a slav-
ery relationship to one that is morally permissible, it is sometimes over-
looked that this strongly implies the existence of preexisting human
64. Indentured servitude coexisted with chattel slavery throughout most of its history
in America. See Abbott Emerson Smith, Colonists in Bondage: White Servitude and
Convict Labor in Anerica, 1607-1776, at 336 (1947) ("If we exclude the Puritan
migrations of the 1630s, it is safe to say that not less than one-half, nor more than two-
thirds of white immigrants to the colonies were indentured servants or redemptioners or
convicts."). Such arrangements were voluntary, but still objectionable in my view because
the servant was bound to service for a period of years and could not exit. For reasons why
this too violates the inalienable rights of persons, see Barnett, Structure of Liberty, supra
note 1, at 77-82. Other classical liberals have defended such "voltntary slavery"
arrangements as morally permissible. See, e.g., Nozick, supra note 58, at 331.
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rights. For only if persons have a background right to refuse their con-
sent can we ever say they have consented. Such a background right of
refusal must, therefore, precede the creation of a duty of obedience
based on consent. If consent is the source of a duty to obey the law, then
first come rights and only then comes law. As we shall soon see in Part
III, in the absence of consent, the preexistence of these background or
"natural" rights has important implications for any legal system that
claims a duty of obedience.
B. Hypothetical Consent and the Importance of Rights
Some political theorists rely upon a notion of "hypothetical consent"
or that to which a rational person would consent. 65 To evaluate claims of
constitutional legitimacy based on "We the People," we need not get en-
meshed in the intricacies of such rational choice theories. It is sufficient
to note that hypothetical consent is not actual consent. Indeed, actual
consent plays no role in such approaches. Rather, it is a normative ap-
proach that is based on a thought experiment about what people under
certain conditions ought to consent to, regardless of whether they do con-
sent or not.
In other words, while an argument based on "hypothetical consent"
may well provide an argument in favor of certain moral or political princi-
ples, such an argument is not based on the real world consent of anyone
to anything. This means that hypothetical consent provides no consent-
based reason to ignore or evade the background rights of the people-if,
that is, people do have rights prior to the formation of a legal system. 66
Properly understood, arguments based upon hypothetical consent actu-
ally help us understand why lawmakers must respect the background
rights of the people they purport to bind.
Lysander Spooner was perhaps the earliest American constitutional
theorist to recognize that an argument based on hypothetical consent
"exist[ing] only in theory"67 is required to respect the rights of the individ-
65. See, e.g., John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 11 (rev. ed. 1999) ("The choice which
rational men would make in this hypothetical situation of equal liberty... determines the
principles ofjustice.").
66. This is the principal thesis of Barnett, Structure of Liberty, supra note 1. There I
argue that certain fundamental rights-as well as the rule of law-are essential to solve the
pervasive social problems of knowledge, interest, and power. Though these rights precede
the formation of a legal system and are therefore "prepolitical," because they only arise in a
social context, they should not be considered "presocial."
67. Lysander Spooner, The Unconstitutionality of Slavery (rev. ed. 1860), reprinted in
4 The Collected Works of Lysander Spooner 1, 153 (Charles Shively ed., 1971) (works in
collection separately paginated) [hereinafter Collected Works] ("Our constitutions
purport to be established by 'the people,' and, in theory, 'all the people' consent to such
government as the constitutions authorize. But this consent of 'the people' exists only in
theory. It has no existence in fact."); see also id. at 225 ("The whole matter of the
adoption of the constitution is mainly a matter of assumption and theory, rather than of
actual fact."). All of Spooner's writings and letters are readily accessible at http://www.
lysanderspooner.org.
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ual because everyone cannot be presumed-in the absence of express or
actual consent-to have given up their rights: 'Justice is evidently the
only principle that everybody can be presumed to agree to, in the forma-
tion of government."6 3 In the absence of actual consent, a government
that protects the rights of all "is the only government which it is practica-
ble to establish by the [theoretical] consent of all the governed; for an
unjust government must have victims, and the victims cannot be sup-
posed to give their consent."69
In sum, an argument based on theoretical or hypothetical consent is
inadequate to justify overriding background rights. To the contrary, for a
constitution to be legitimate on the basis of hypothetical (as opposed to
actual) consent, it must be shown that such a constitution is consistent with
the background rights of the individual. In the next Part, I shall consider
an alternative conception of constitutional legitimacy that explains both
how laws can bind the citizenry in conscience in the absence of consent
and why, because consent is lacking, the lawmaking power of government
must be limited. Indeed, I argue that, in the absence of unanimous con-
sent, there is a duty to obey the law only when the legislature's powers are
limited.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL LEGITIMACY WITHOUT CONSENT
At some level, advocates of popular sovereignty probably realize full
well that there is no real consent to obey the laws made pursuant to the
Constitution. Nevertheless, they might contend that, because unanimous
consent to a constitution is obviously impossible, majoritarian consent is
the closest we can come to real consent and this makes it sufficient to
legitimate governance. One response to this argument is that when it
comes to consent, coming close is not good enough. Consent is either
present or it is absent. Anything short of consent is not consent.
Moreover, if it can be shown that lawmaking based on unanimous
consent is both possible and practical, then it could no longer be alleged
that majoritarian consent is justified by necessity. With unanimous con-
sent no longer a hopeless ideal, it also becomes easier to see why, in the
absence of unanimous consent, legitimacy requires that limits or con-
straints be imposed on majoritarian governance.
As I explain in section III.A, because unanimous consent to govern-
ance is possible (though not to the form of governance provided by this
Constitution), majoritarian consent cannot be justified on grounds of ne-
cessity. Second, as will be discussed in section III.B, the argument con-
tending that majoritarian consent is sufficient as "second best" ignores
the constraint that must be imposed on any institution that is legitimated
by this type of fictitious consent: The background rights of nonconsenting per-
sons must be protected. Therefore, even if majoritarian rule is necessary, the
68. Id. at 143.
69. Id.
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fact that it lacks actual consent gives rise to an imperative that this form of
rule be limited in ways that genuinely consent-based rule need not.
A. More Consent, Less Freedom: Forgoing Rights
My argument in Part I assumes, uncontroversially, that a duty of obe-
dience could be grounded on consent if everyone consented to be so
bound. One reason this condition fails to be met under our constitu-
tional system is that the polity is simply too big ever to consent unani-
mously to anything.11 But suppose that the relevant lawmaking unit was
much much smaller than the United States, indeed smaller than any state
and even most cities. Would unanimous consent then be possible? I
think it would. Let me now briefly sketch how unanimous consent is
practical.
My parents live in a large private residential community known as
Leisure World. When they bought their home, they also expressly agreed
to a governance structure that is highly democratic. Leisure World is typi-
cal in this regard, though governance arrangements do vary among dif-
ferent residential communities. As with most other communities, the
structure of Leisure World empowers the governing board to authorize
numerous restrictions on behavior within the community. Houses can-
not be expanded without a permit, nor can they be rented for long peri-
ods of time. Indeed, no one under fifty-five years of age is allowed to
purchase a home in this community.
I could go on at length listing the freedom-constraining regulations
that exist in Leisure World. Have my parents consented to obey these
rules? Yes, but not in the sense that they consented to each and every
rule as it was enacted. Rather, they expressly consented to the existing
rules of Leisure World when they purchased their home, and they also
expressly agreed to the governance structure by which the rules would be
administered and changed. They committed to be bound by the out-
come of this structure every bit as much as contracting parties expressly
agree to be bound by the outcome of private arbitration when such a
clause is in their contract.
In Leisure World, then, there is actual unanimous consent to be
bound by the rulemaking process. Why cannot we say the same thing
about other lawmaking authorities? One obvious reason is that our con-
sent is never solicited. Would such a solicitation be appropriate? Could
the town I live in have required my consent to the outcome of our munic-
ipal lawmaking process before it allowed me to reside there? Could the
state I live in have required such consent before I moved there? Not
without encountering the vicious circle of authority described in Part 1.71
Unlike the town and state in which I live, Leisure World originally pur-
70. As will be shown shortly, the size of the polity makes unanimous consent
impossible only when lawmaking jurisdiction is defined geographically.
71. See supra Part I.B.2.
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chased and owned all the land on which it is built, and sold parcels only
on the condition that purchasers accept its governance structure. Be-
cause of its original ownership, it could rightfully condition sale on obedi-
ence to the governance structure of Leisure World. 72
But initial ownership and initial consent are not the only morally
relevant differences between communities like Leisure World and polities
governed by federal, state, and municipal lawmakers. Leisure World and
thousands of communities just like it are also distinguished by the low
cost of exit that makes that initial consent meaningful. As Frank Knight
emphasized, "effective freedom depends upon an alternative open to the
non-conforming individual of leaving the group without suffering loss or
damage. In fact, freedom is chiefly a matter of 'competition' between
groups for members. '73
Though Leisure World is fairly large-larger than many small
towns-it is a relatively small part of a larger metropolitan area. If you do
not like the rulemaking system of Leisure World, you can buy a house
across the street where the rules and rulemaking procedures may be very
different and more to your liking. The cost of exit is quite low.
By "cost of exit" I refer not merely to the financial costs of moving to
another location, but to the other sacrifices you make by that choice.7 4 If
you want to live and enjoy a particular area, if you do not want to aban-
don your friends, social network, local customs and cuisine, or job, but
you dislike the rules or rulemaking process in Leisure World, you can buy
a home across the street, or up the road a bit. This applies when you
make your initial decision of where to live as well as when you continue to
remain within the jurisdiction. And it applies to nongeographic legal ju-
risdictions as well.
As I have described elsewhere at greater length, 75 the jurisdiction of
lawmakers over individuals need not be allocated geographically. We can
join and consent to thejurisdictions of myriad organizations, each with its
own rules and regulations, that stretch around the world and comprise
72. 1 am not unaware of the serious philosophical issues raised by this paragraph. For
example, how do physical resources come justly to be privately owned in the first place,
and what conditions can justly be placed on their alienation? While not strictly beyond the
scope of this Essay, it would be unduly distracting to parse and pursue them at this point.
However they are resolved, the difference remains: Justifying the control over property
exercised by persons who obtain title by the consent of previous rightful owners, or by first
possession, is a substantially different matter than justifying the claims of some to rule
territory belonging to others. This is simply another variant of the "first come rights, then
comes lawmaking" proposition discussed above. See supra Part ILA; see also infra Part
IlI.B. For further discussion of the rightful acquisition of property, see Barnett, Structure
of Liberty, supra note 1, at 69-71, 153-54.
73. Frank H. Knight, Freedom and Reform 416 (1982).
74. See Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual
Consent, 78 Va. L. Rev. 821, 902-05 (1992) (defending the claim that consent even to
immutable contract rules can be actual when the cost of exit is sufficiently low).
75. See Barnett, Structure of Liberty, supra note 1, at 238-97 (describing a
"polycentric" constitutional order).
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millions of persons. From employers, to professional associations, to
health care organizations, to book clubs, to churches, mosques, and syna-
gogues, to file-sharing networks on the Internet-the list is endless-each
group enjoys the unanimous consent of its members to obey its rules.
The cost of exit is low with nongeographically-based jurisdictions pre-
cisely because members do not have to leave home to join or to resign
their membership. Members can and do actually consent to all sorts of
limitations on their freedom. In this way, the exact composition of each
person's duty to adhere to the various lawmaking powers of others is
likely to be as unique as the individual.
It was Lon Fuller who most famously contended that these sorts of
rulemaking activities are as entitled as geographically-based legal systems
to be called "systems of law":
If law is considered as "the enterprise of subjecting human con-
duct to the governance of rules," then this enterprise is being
conducted, not on two or three fronts, but on thousands. En-
gaged in this enterprise are those who draft and administer
rules governing the internal affairs of clubs, churches, schools,
labor unions, trade associations, agricultural fairs, and a hun-
dred and one other forms of human association.... [T] here are
in this country alone "systems of law" numbering in the hun-
dreds of thousands. 76
What Fuller does not mention is that these myriad legal systems have the
moral imprimatur of unanimous consent that large geographically-based
legal systems necessarily lack. For when geography defines jurisdiction,
size matters.
The larger the land area, the higher the cost of exit and thus the less
meaningful is "tacit" consent to the jurisdiction of the lawmaking process.
Most modern cities are probably too large, but even if they are small
enough, states are certainly too large to command meaningful unani-
mous consent. If large territorial lawmaking authorities are to command
a duty of obedience it must be on some grounds other than the consent
of the governed. Of course, when geographically-based lawmaking au-
thorities first purchase the land over which they claim jurisdiction, we can
say that consent by subsequent purchasers or lessors to the jurisdiction of
the original owner is both consensual and unanimous.
To be clear, simply lowering the cost of exit is no substitute for the
initial title by which a rightful owner can condition continued presence
on acceptance of a lawmaking procedure. Even with this initial assent,
however, were consent-based territories to grow to the size of currentju-
risdictions, it becomes less clear that consent can be inferred from an
unwillingness of persons born therein to incur the cost of exit. To main-
tain their authority, such consent-based regimes might have to subsidize
the exit of those who do not consent. Still, in the real world, the need to
76. See Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law 124-25 (rev. ed. 1969).
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raise the funds to make such purchases will naturally limit the size of such
jurisdictional claims and keep the cost of exit within reason.
Thus, contrary to conventional wisdom, against a background of ini-
tial entitlements, unanimous consent to obey the law is quite possible, but
only if the cost of exit is sufficiently small, either because jurisdiction is
not geographically based or because the geographical territory is not too
large. Where such unanimous consent exists, legal regulations can cover
virtually any subject, provided they do not infringe upon inalienable
rights or upon the rights of third parties. This is true because persons
may consent to alienate or waive many of their rights. The clearest differ-
ence between a prize fight and a battery, between making forceful love
and rape, is consent.
Under the conditions of unanimous consent, then, liberty is not in-
consistent with both heavy regulation and even the prohibition of other-
wise rightful conduct. Ironically, with a governance structure based on
unanimous consent, there may be far less freedom of action than in its
absence. To the extent that such communitarian constraints on freedom
are desirable, this is the context in which they are permissible and bind-
ing in conscience.
B. Less Consent, More Freedom: Protecting Rights
Only when lawmaking authority is imposed over a relatively large ge-
ographical area does unanimous consent become impractical. Can such
jurisdiction ever be legitimate in the absence of consent and, if so, under
what conditions? The answer begins with understanding why, when it
does exist, consent legitimates lawmaking.
Consent only legitimates lawmaking on the assumption that
"[i]ndividuals have rights, and there are things no person or group may
do to them (without violating their rights).'77 Nor is this merely an as-
sumption. As I have explained elsewhere, the existence of individual
rights is an appropriate conclusion from the nature of human beings and
the world in which we live. 78 This conclusion was accepted by the framers
of the United States Constitution as well as by those who wrote the Four-
teenth Amendment. 79
One need not accept any particular formulation of background
rights, however, to accept the conception of constitutional legitimacy ad-
vanced here. For present purposes, it is only necessary to note that for
consent to legitimize a lawmaking process, we must presuppose that con-
sent matters-that people have a right to consent and, by necessary impli-
cation, a right to withhold their consent. Otherwise consent would not
77. Nozick, supra note 58, at ix.
78. See Barnett, Structure of Liberty, supra note 1, at 17-25. I do not claim that the
argument presented there is the only valid justification for individual rights.
79. 1 will justify this historical claim in Randy E. Barnett, Restoring the Lost
Constitution: The Presumption of Liberty (forthcoming 2003) [hereinafter Barnett,
Restoring the Lost Constitution].
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be required and could not impart legitimacy upon that to which one has
consented. In sum, for consent to matter in the first instance, we must
assume (and there is also good reason to conclude) that "first come
rights, and then comes law" or "first come rights, then comes govern-
ment." Historically, the rights that people have independently of govern-
ment were called "inherent" or "natural" rights. Today, they are often
referred to as "human" rights.
The assumption that "first come rights, then comes government"
helps explain how lawmaking can be legitimate in the absence of con-
sent. For a law would be just, and therefore binding in conscience, if its
restrictions on a citizen's freedom were (1) necessary to protect the rights
of others, and (2) proper insofar as they did not violate the preexisting
rights of the persons on whom they were imposed. The second of these
requirements dispenses with the need to obtain the consent of the person
on whom a law is imposed. After all, if a law has not violated a person's
rights, then that person's consent is simply not required. The first re-
quirement supplies the element of obligation. If a law is necessary to
protect the rights of others, then it is as obligatory for the person on
whom it is imposed as protecting that person's rights are obligatory on
the legal system itself."') Persons have an obligation to obey such a law
just as they have an obligation to respect the rights of others.
We have then reached an ironic conclusion: With unanimous con-
sent, there can be many more legitimate restrictions on freedom than
when consent is absent. Because people may consent to just about any-
thing, they have the liberty to consent to laws that greatly restrict their
freedom. However, in the absence of actual consent, their background
liberty rights remain intact and must not be infringed. In sum, while ac-
tual consent can justify restrictions on freedom, without actual consent,
liberty must be strictly protected. Therefore, when we move outside a
community constituted by unanimous consent, laws must be scrutinized
to ensure both that they are necessary and that they do not improperly
infringe upon the rights retained by the people.
C. Clarifications and Caveats
This theory of constitutional legitimacy is susceptible to being misun-
derstood in several ways. To avoid this, I should emphasize precisely what
I am claiming and the limits of this claim.
1. Beyond Respecting and Protecting Rights. - In this Part, I am only
offering ajustification for a duty of obedience in the absence of consent,
a justification that extends only to laws that are both necessary to protect
the rights of others and proper insofar as they do not violate the rights of
the persons whose freedom they restrict. I do not claim that my argu-
80. This is true as well when government is regulating or restricting the use of its own
property. In such cases, the rights it is protecting are its own, though it might be wise to
put restrictions on how government may use or restrict the use of its own property.
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ment on behalf of this limited duty of obedience also provides an affirma-
tive argument against any other source of nonconsensual legitimacy that
might broaden a moral duty of obedience.
Though my argument does not itself rule out other potential justifi-
cations of nonconsensual duties of obedience, those who claim that a per-
son's freedom may be restricted for ends other than the protection of
rights must justify this further extension of power. In Part I, we saw the
weakness of arguments based on tacit consent and benefits received.
Elsewhere I have explored the surprising weaknesses of arguments based
on retributive and distributive justice.8 1
Though the strength of procedural protections that both respect and
protect background rights justifies a duty of nonconsenting persons to
obey the law, this particular rationale extends only so far and no farther.
Readers who want more than this from lawmaking might want to consider
the protection of background rights a baseline by which to assess legiti-
macy. That is, a legitimate legal system is one that provides assurances
that its liberty-restricting commands are necessary to protect the rights of
others and do not improperly violate the rights of those on whom they
are imposed. Whether a legal system that does more (or less) than this is
also legitimate is an open question that requires additional analysis and
justification.
It also bears mentioning that a large proportion of government ac-
tion does not involve coercively imposing commands on the citizens.
When the Post Office sets its hours of operation or the price of its postage
stamps it is acting in the capacity of an owner of a business. It is no more
restricting the rightful freedoms of the citizenry than a private organiza-
tion that does the same. Such commands are perfectly proper under Ar-
ticle I, Section 8 which gives Congress the power "to establish Post Of-
fices. '82 However, when Congress claims for its post office a monopoly
and punishes those who would carry mail in competition with it-a power
nowhere enumerated in the Constitution 3-it would have the burden of
showing the necessity and propriety of such a command or it would not
be binding in conscience.
Even without additional justification, however, the theory of constitu-
tional legitimacy advanced here does not rule out more ambitious imposi-
tions of duties on persons than the protection of rights. On this account,
there are two, not one, sources of binding law: laws that are produced by
unanimous consent regimes, and laws that are produced by regimes
whose legitimacy rests solely on procedural assurances that the rights of
the nonconsenting persons on whom they are imposed have been pro-
tected. Whatever additional types of laws and regulations beyond the
protection of rights are thought desirable can usually be obtained within
81. See Barnett, Structure of Liberty, supra note 1, at 308-21.
82. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.
83. See Lysander Spooner, The Unconstitutionality of the Laws of Congress,
Prohibiting Private Mails (1844), reprinted in 1 Collected Works, supra note 67, at 1, 5.
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the unanimous consent communities that, as we have seen, are both pos-
sible and pervasive.
Like Leisure World, academic and religious communities, for exam-
ple, impose a wide variety of additional duties on their members. Those
who insist that geographical nonconsent-based lawmaking is necessary be-
cause unanimous consent to lawmaking is impossible are simply in error.
That which already exists is clearly possible. And those who contend that
these unanimous consent communities are somehow inadequate must jus-
tify, not merely assert, their claim. In so doing, they must be careful to
show why the same deficiencies do not apply as well to nonconsensual
territorially-based legal systems-especially in a world in which a diversity
of such systems compete with one another and no one legal system can
ensure the right outcome in all the others.
Still, depending on the view of rights we adopt, even unanimous con-
sent regimes may be subject to some limit to the duties they can legiti-
mately impose. If there are some rights that cannot be waived or trans-
ferred, even by the consent of the right holder, then unanimous consent
regimes, to be legitimate, must offer procedural assurances that these ina-
lienable rights have been protected. Inalienable rights are those that can
be reclaimed, even after they are waived by a right holder.8 4 For exam-
ple, while one can consent to fight in a ring or to have sexual relations
with another person, the inalienable nature of the right to one's own
person entails that one can always change one's mind and refuse to con-
tinue. On this account of inalienable rights, the most important proce-
dural feature that even unanimous consent regimes must respect would
be the preservation of a perpetual right to exit the regime.35
This last point also highlights the relationship between the theory of
legitimacy defended here and the theory ofjustice upon which the legiti-
macy of any particular legal system depends. Such a right of exit is not a
feature of the concept of constitutional legitimacy defended here.
Rather it is a procedure that would protect against the violation of certain
inalienable rights. Though one can accept the procedural conception of
legitimacy advanced here without concurring on a particular theory of
justice, determining which procedures are needed to ensure that laws
promulgated by a particular legal system are not unjust will depend on
the conception of justice one holds.
2. The Meaning of "Necessay & Proper. "- I have borrowed the stan-
dard of "necessary and proper" from the Constitution itself. Article I
grants Congress the power to "make all Laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution"8 6 the other powers that are vested by
the Constitution in the national government. I am not claiming that the
original meaning of this clause is identical to the meaning I contend is
84. See generally Terrance C. McConnell, Inalienable Rights 3-44 (2000).
85. I thank Dawn Nunziato for her insightful comments that led to this caveat on the
legitimacy of unanimous consent regimes.
86. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.
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the prerequisite of constitutional legitimacy.8 7 Two differences are im-
mediately apparent.
The Necessary and Proper Clause requires that laws be necessary to
the execution of any power delegated to the national government by the
Constitution, not just the power to protect the rights of others. In this
respect, the clause has a conception of "proper" that is broader or more
permissive than mine. Part of the reason for this is that the government
is charged with performing many functions, the performance of which
does not require the restriction of personal freedom. On the other hand,
as has been shown by Gary Lawson and Patricia Granger, propriety in-
cludes not only the protection of individual rights but also an adherence
to principles of federalism and separation of powers.8 8 In this respect,
the clause is narrower or less permissive. A law that violates principles of
federalism may be improper even though it does not infringe upon the
rights of individuals.
In the absence of actual consent, then, every freedom-restricting law
must be scrutinized to see if it is both necessary to protect the rights of
others and does not improperly violate the rights of those whose freedom
is restricted. In the absence of actual consent, a legitimate lawmaking
process is one that provides adequate assurances that the laws it validates
are just in this respect. If a lawmaking process provides these assurances,
then it is legitimate and the commands it issues are entitled to a benefit
of the doubt. They are binding in conscience unless shown to be unjust.
CONCLUSION
The problem of constitutional legitimacy is to establish why, in the
absence of actual consent to be bound, anyone should care what a consti-
tutionally valid law may command. I am not asking why people perceive a
constitution to be legitimate and constitutional laws binding in con-
87. I discuss the original meaning of this clause at length in Randy E. Barnett,
Necessary and Proper, 44 UCLA L. Rev. 745, 751-63 (1997) (distinguishing between
Madisonian and Marshallian conceptions of "necessity"). In Restoring the Lost Constitution, I
qualify somewhat my historical claims by showing how Madison's (and others') conception
of "necessity" was closer-though by no means identical-to that of Hamilton (and
Marshall) than is commonly believed. See Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution, supra
note 79; see also David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: State and
Congressional Powers, 1801-1835, 49 U. Chi. L. Rev. 887, 932 (1982) (discussing John
Marshall's opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland and concluding that "[i]n light of earlier
statements in his opinion, the implication seems unmistakable: incidental authority must
not be so broadly construed as to subvert the basic principle that Congress has limited
powers").
88. Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The "Proper" Scope of Federal Power: A
Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 Duke LJ. 267, 297 (1993)
(arguing that to be proper, "executory laws must be consistent with principles of
separation of powers, principles of federalism, and individual rights"); see also Printz v.
United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923-24 (1997) ("When a 'La[w] . . . for carrying into
Execution' the Commerce Clause violates the principle of state sovereignty ... it is not a
'La[w] ... proper for carrying into Execution the Commerce Clause."').
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science. Instead, I am asking what qualities a constitution should have to
justify this perception. My answer is that we may owe a prima facie duty
to obey a constitutionally valid law only if the constitutional processes
used to enact laws provide good reasons to think that a law restricting
freedom is necessary to protect the rights of others without improperly
infringing the rights of those whose liberty is being restricted.
As we have already seen, this quality depends upon the presence or
absence of consent. When consent is present, a lawful command can re-
strict almost any freedom except an inalienable right. However, when
consent is lacking, as it is with respect to the Constitution of the United
States, to bind in conscience, a law must be both necessary to the protec-
tion of the rights of others and proper insofar as it does not violate the
rights of those upon whom it is imposed. A constitutionally legitimate
lawmaking process provides an assurance that both these requirements
have been met.
What exactly are these rights that a legitimate lawmaking process
must assure us have not been violated? I myself maintain that the natural
rights people have before they form a legal system and which they retain
unless they consent to their alienation are 'liberty rights.""' I further
maintain that, as a matter of positive law, the Ninth Amendment affords
protection to these liberty rights "retained by the people" from the na-
tional government, while the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment protects the same liberty rights (and others) from
violation by states0'1 Moreover, if protecting background rights is the
only thing thatjustifies imposing legal commands on nonconsenting peo-
ple, the more expansive is one's conception of rights, the greater the
number of commands one will believe are warranted. For this reason,
recognizing the absence of consent seems to argue for a less ambitious,
rather than a broader, conception of background rights.
You do not, however, have to agree with the framers' or with my
account of justice or natural rights to accept the theory of constitutional
legitimacy advanced in this Essay. We can be in full agreement that,
when consent is lacking, a constitution is legitimate only when it provides
sufficient procedures to assure that the laws enacted pursuant to its pro-
cedures are just.91 At the same time, we can disagree about what it is that
makes a law just and, for that matter, what procedures are sufficient to
89. This normative claim is the principal thesis of Barnett, Structure of Liberty, supra
note 1.
90. U.S. Const. amends. IX, XIV. This descriptive historical claim is defended at
length in Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution, supra note 79.
91. This argument is actually quite similar in structure to that of Rawls:
[I]n the constitutional convention the aim of the parties is to find among the just
constitutions ... the one most likely to lead to just and effective legislation in view
of the general facts about the society in question. The constitution is regarded as
a just but imperfect procedure framed as far as the circumstances permit to
insure a just outcome.
Rawls, supra note 65, at 353.
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assure that laws are likely to be just in the relevant sense. This is no differ-
ent than theorists who agree that the "consent of the governed" legiti-
mates a constitution while disagreeing about what constitutes such con-
sent and whether it exists in a particular case.
My claim here is only that (1) anything short of actual consent can-
not bind a nonconsenting party; (2) the U.S. Constitution is legitimated
neither by actual consent of the governed nor by receipt of benefits; (3)
unanimous consent to lawmaking is both possible and pervasive; but (4)
in the absence of actual unanimous consent, to be legitimate, a constitu-
tion must provide sufficient procedural assurances that whatever quality
makes a law just and therefore binding in conscience goes in before the
name law goes on a particular command.9 2
For better or worse, this makes legitimacy outside of unanimous con-
sent legal regimes a matter of degree rather than an all-or-nothing char-
acteristic. Above the threshold where a law is more likely than not to be
just, the more effectively procedures ensure that valid laws are just, the
greater the presumption to be accorded those laws enacted under them.
The more confidence we have in enacted laws, the more skeptical we can
be about a claim that a particular law is unjust. In this Essay, it is not
possible for me to describe all the characteristics that I believe contribute
to legitimate lawmaking. Familiar features of our legal system-wide-
spread suffrage, separation of powers, federalism, and a written constitu-
tion that "locks in" these practices as well as lists both enumerated powers
and enumerated rights-each play a role if properly respected. So too
does judicial review by ensuring that these legitimacy-enhancing features
are indeed respected. So too would the adoption of a "presumption of
liberty," which would place the burden on the government tojustify to a
court that its freedom-restricting commands are both necessary and
proper.9 3
By acknowledging that, above a certain threshold, constitutional le-
gitimacy is a matter of degree, the theory I am proposing does not always
provide a clean answer to the question of whether a particular lawmaking
process, taken as a whole, is sufficient to provide enacted legislation with
the benefit of the doubt. But it does confront the question that others
92. Elsewhere, I make the further claim that, if a particular legal system includes the
adoption of a written constitution to "lock in" the other procedural features that help
ensure laws are just, then within such a system, judges, when interpreting the text, must
adhere to the original meaning of the written constitution to the extent that this meaning
can be ascertained. Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 Loy. L. Rev.
611, 643 (1999). Where that meaning is vague or incomplete, however, supplementation
or "construction" is permissible-indeed inevitable-and constitutional constructions that
do not contradict original meaning should be adopted when they enhance whatever it is
that makes laws legitimate. Id. at 645-47. I greatly expand upon this discussion in Barnett,
Restoring the Lost Constitution, supra note 79.
93. I offer a preliminary defense of the "presumption of liberty" in Barnett, Getting
Normative, supra note 8, at 113-21, and an extended defense in Barnett, Restoring the
Lost Constitution, supra note 79.
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neglect and answers it by positing something real, not fictitious, that we
should be looking for: procedures that assure that enacted legislation
does not violate the rights retained by the people. And it also allows us to
conclude that some constitutions are more legitimate than others.
It is an open question whether the U.S. Constitution-either as writ-
ten or as actually applied-is in fact legitimate. Intellectual honesty re-
quires us to acknowledge the possibility that no constitution lacking
unanimous consent is capable of producing laws that bind in conscience.
Therefore, though the conception of legitimacy offered here may not al-
ways be easy to apply, and though it invites debate and controversy about
the nature of justice and rights, even skeptical readers might want to give
it the benefit of the doubt. For their alternative may be to admit that
there is no one behind the curtain.
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